

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, PORG

SUBJECT: ALLIANCE EAST-WEST STUDY -- PART III

REF: USNATO 2183

1. THIS MESSAGE FORWARDS A U.S. DRAFT OF PART III OF THE
ALLIANCE EAST-WEST STUDY WHICH HAS NOT REPEAT NOT YET
RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OR INTERAGENCY CLEARANCE. MISSION
COMMENTS ON IT, BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL, ARE
REQUESTED, IF POSSIBLE, IN TIME FOR WASHINGTON WORKING GROUP
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DISCUSSION TO BE HELD 1000 WASHINGTON TIME, WEDNESDAY,
MARCH 22.
-- CHANGES TO THIS VERSION WILL BE FORWARDED TO MISSION
BY COB MARCH 23 WASHINGTON TIME SO THAT MISSION CAN PUT
TOGETHER FINAL U.S. PART III CONTRIBUTION FOR DISTRIBUTION
TO ALLIES FRIDAY, MARCH 24.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. UNCLES DRAFT PART III:

PART III - NATO EAST-WEST STUDY

INTRODUCTION

1. A DECADE AGO THE ALLIANCE AFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT

TO THE TWIN GOALS OF DETENTE AND DEFENSE. THE ENSUING YEARS HAVE WITNESSED IMPORTANT CHANGES IN BOTH AREAS WHICH GIVE RISE TO NEW ALLIANCE TASKS IN BOTH AREAS. RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST HAVE BECOME MORE COMPLEX. BOTH BILATERALLY AND MULTILATERALLY, INTERACTIONS HAVE BEEN EXPANDED -- THOUGH AT AN UNEVEN PACE -- IN SECURITY, ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND CULTURE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE EAST-WEST MILITARY BALANCE HAS, IN SOME SIGNIFICANT SECTORS, SHIFTED IN FAVOR OF THE EAST DURING THESE YEARS. IN REAFFIRMING NOW ITS COMMITMENT TO DETENTE AND DEFENSE, THE ALLIANCE MUST CONTINUE AND ELABORATE THE FORMER, WHILE INTENSIFYING ITS EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE LATTER.

2. INTELLIGENT ALLIANCE POLICIES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD MUST ALSO BE ROOTED IN A SENSITIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE DEVELOPING TRENDS IN EASTERN EUROPE SECRET

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(FOOTNOTE - THROUGHOUT THIS STUDY, THE TERM "EASTERN EUROPE" IS USED TO REFER TO THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES.) AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN SOME IMPORTANT RESPECTS FOR THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES THE NEXT DECADE PROMISES TO BE ONE OF TRANSITION AND FLUX, TO WHICH THE ALLIANCE MUST RESPOND WITH NEW INITIATIVES. IN ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS INTO THE EARLY 1980., SEVEN SIGNIFICANT TRENDS DESERVE SPECIAL ATTENTION:

-- THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST COOPERATION

-- THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP

-- DEEPENING SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

-- THE IMPENDING SOVIET SUCCESSION

-- PROSPECTIVE DIFFICULTIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

-- SOVIET EXPANSIONISM OUTSIDE EUROPE

-- THE LOSS OF SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL MOMENTUM.

EACH OF THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS RECAPITULATES THE RELEVANT FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY, OUTLINES THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE AND EXPLORES POSSIBLE

WESTERN INITIATIVES.

A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST COOPERATION

3. IN THE LAST TEN YEARS THE BARRIERS THAT DIVIDE EAST AND WEST HAVE BECOME MORE PERMEABLE. COMMERCE AND COOPERATION IN A WIDE VARIETY OF FIELDS HAVE INTENSIFIED. THE PATTERN OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IS
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BECOMING MORE EXTENSIVE AND MULTIFACETED. IN THE SOVIET UNION AND--EVEN MORE MARKEDLY--IN EASTERN EUROPE, THERE ARE LIKELY TO BE SIGNIFICANT PRESSURES FOR ENLARGING THE SPHERES OF COLLABORATION WITH THE WEST. A MORE URBANIZED, INDUSTRIALIZED, AND EDUCATED POPULACE WILL BE MORE AWARE OF AND PROBABLY MORE SYMPATHETIC TO THE ADVANTAGES OF GENUINE DETENTE. INCREASING EAST-WEST CONTACTS BETWEEN SCIENTISTS, FOREIGN TRADE EXPERTS, TECHNICIANS AND EVEN ORDINARY CITIZENS MAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF BROADENING AND DEEPENING THE CONSTITUENCIES INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. CONVERSELY, SHOULD SOVIET LEADERS IN THE FUTURE CONSIDER VEERING TOWARD A MORE NEGATIVE COURSE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, THESE VESTED INTERESTS MAY SEEK TO EMPHASIZE THE COSTS OF SUCH A CHANGE. NEITHER THE ROLE OF "WESTERNIZERS" IN RUSSIAN HISTORY NOR THE EVEN GREATER TRADITIONAL ATTRACTION OF THE WEST WITHIN THE NATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE SHOULD BE UNDERESTIMATED.

4. IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST TO ENCOURAGE ANY SIGNS IN MOSCOW OF A WILLINGNESS TO SEE COOPERATION RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST AS BEING IN SOVIET INTERESTS. CONVERSELY, THE WEST SHOULD TRY, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, TO INHIBIT SOVIET XENOPHOBIA, CHAUVINISM, OR PARANOIA. ONE OF THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE CSCE PROCESS HAS BEEN TO REGULARIZE AND INTENSIFY THE FLOW OF PEOPLE AND IDEAS, AS WELL AS GOODS AND SERVICES, BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. BOTH COLLECTIVELY AND INDIVIDUALLY, THE WESTERN POWERS SHOULD CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE SUCH TRENDS.

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B. THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP

5. THE STEADY ENHANCEMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH ACROSS THE ENTIRE RANGE OF CAPABILITIES

HAS BEEN, AND WILL REMAIN, A TOP PRIORITY OF THE KREMLIN, DURING THE PAST DECADE, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ACHIEVED ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN STRATEGIC

FORCES WITH THE UNITED STATES. IT HAS ALSO STEADILY INCREASED ITS THEATER NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE. PARTICULARLY DISTURBING IN AN ERA OF STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE, BOTH THE QUANTITY AND THE QUALITY OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AIMED AT WESTERN EUROPE HAVE ALSO RISEN STEADILY. IN BOTH NUMBERS AND CHARACTER, THESE NEW CAPABILITIES ARE DISPROPORTIONATE TO REASONABLE SOVIET DEFENSIVE NEEDS. AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION FOR THE BUILDUP CAN BE LIMITED NEITHER TO BUREAUCRATIC PRESSURES WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP NOR TO SOVIET OVER-INSURANCE AGAINST MULTIPLE THREATS, BUT MUST REFER TO THE SOVIET DESIRE TO TRANSLATE MILITARY POWER INTO POLITICAL INFLUENCE.

6. BECAUSE OF ITS MOUNTING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, BUREAUCRATIC OSSIFICATIONS AND IDEOLOGICAL MALAISE, THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS AN "INCOMPLETE SUPERPOWER." THE INTERNATIONAL STANDING OF THE REGIME THUS DEPENDS INCREASINGLY ON ITS MILITARY POWER, AND ON ITS ABILITY TO TRANSLATE THAT POWER INTO POLITICAL INFLUENCE, BOTH IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER AND ELSEWHERE. (THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET POWER PROJECTION OUTSIDE EUROPE ARE DISCUSSED BELOW.) WITHIN EUROPE, THE SOVIETS SEEK TO USE THE WEIGHT OF THEIR GEOPOLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESENCE FOR PURPOSES OF POLITICAL INTIMIDATION, PARTICULARLY IN PERIPHERAL AREAS. UNFAVORABLE TRENDS IN THE
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MILITARY BALANCE WITHIN EUROPE WOULD, IF UNADDRESSED, CALL INTO QUESTION NATO'S ABILITY TO DETER AND DEFEND AGAINST AGGRESSION.

7. AS ALLIANCE POLICY-MAKERS HAVE ALREADY RECOGNIZED, THESE THREATS REQUIRE BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY RESPONSES. THE ALLIANCE PREFERS TO ENGAGE THE WARSAW PACT IN EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, SO THAT MILITARY STABILITY COULD BE ACHIEVED AT A LOWER LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS, LESS DANGEROUS AND LESS COSTLY TO BOTH SIDES. SALT CONSTITUTES THE HEART OF THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. SALT TWO SHOULD BE CONCLUDED AT AN EARLY TIME AND FURTHER STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD MOVE TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS AND TO QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS. CONCLUSION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN WOULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO LIMITS ON THE QUALITATIVE ARMS RACE AND TO OUR

NONPROLIFERATION GOALS. MBFR IS THE FIRST MAJOR EFFORT TO STABILIZE THE NATO - WARSAW PACT MILITARY BALANCE THROUGH ARMS CONTROL. THE CENTRAL ALLIED INTEREST IN MBFR IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A STABLE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE WHICH WILL BE SUSTAINABLE OVER THE LONG TERM. THE ALLIES SHOULD ALSO CONTINUE THEIR FRUITFUL CONSULTATION ABOUT WESTERN INITIATIVES IN MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT FORUMS, INCLUDING THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT.

8. IN THE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, THE WEST MUST RESPOND TO THE GROWING SOVIET MILITARY THREAT WHICH AUGMENTED DEFENSE PROGRAMS FOR THE
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LONG TERM. THE ESTABLISHED NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND FORWARD DEFENSE, ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES, MUST BE SUSTAINED. DETAILED INITIATIVES TO BEGIN TO ADDRESS THE EXISTING EAST-WEST IMBALANCE ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY, AIMED AT INCREASING BOTH THE LEVEL OF WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORT AND THE EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH NATIONAL EXPENDITURES ARE TRANSLATED INTO ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES. IT IS VITAL THAT THESE INITIATIVES BE CARRIED TO FRUITION. IN ADDITION, THE ALLIANCE MUST BE PREPARED THROUGH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AS WELL AS MILITARY STRENGTH TO COUNTERBALANCE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES AND TO RESIST SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO FRAGMENTIZE AND INTIMIDATE THE WEST. ALLIANCE-WIDE CONSULTATION SHOULD BE INTENSIFIED ON EMERGING SECURITY ISSUES.

C. SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

9. ALTHOUGH CURRENTLY THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL POWER IN THE WORLD, THE USSR APPEARS TO BE ENTERING A PROLONGED PERIOD OF REDUCED ECONOMIC GROWTH. IN TERMS OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS, THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO LAG BEHIND THE WEST. SLOWDOWNS IN THE GROWTH OF PRODUCTIVITY WILL BE EXACERBATED BY ADVERSE SECULAR TRENDS IN THE SIZE AND CHARACTER OF THE LABOR FORCE. ENERGY SHORTAGES WILL INCREASINGLY CONSTRAIN SOVIET ECONOMIC CHOICES. PERENNIAL PROBLEMS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR WILL PERSIST. UNDERLYING ALL THESE DIFFICULTIES ARE BUREAUCRATIC RIGIDITIES THAT CANNOT BE EASILY OVERCOME WITHOUT CALLING INTO QUESTION THE PARTY'S FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL CONTROL. WITH DECLINING

ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES, CONTINUING MILITARY BUILDUP

MAY REQUIRE PROPORTIONATE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
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AWAY FROM THE INVESTMENT GOODS SECTOR, THEREBY
FURTHER DAMPENING ECONOMIC GROWTH, OR FROM THE
CONSUMPTION SECTOR, THEREBY DISAPPOINTING THE RISING
EXPECTATIONS OF THE POPULACE.

10. TO EASE THESE DILEMMAS, SOVIET LEADERS ARE
.LIKELY TO SEEK SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTS OF WESTERN
CAPITAL, TECHNOLOGY AND GRAIN. TO OFFSET THE HARD
CURRENCY OUTFLOW, THEY MAY BE FORCED IN THE SHORT
TERM TO CUT BACK IMPORTS SOMEWHAT. NEVERTHELESS, THEY
WILL IN ALL LIKELIHOOD CONTINUE TO SEEK FURTHER
WESTERN CREDITS, WHILE ALSO LOOKING TOWARD COMPEN-
SATION AGREEMENTS AND EXPANDED EXPORTS TO THE
WEST. BECAUSE OF THE INEVITABLE INTERRELATIONSHIP
AMONG THE ECONOMIC, MILITARY, AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS
OF POWER, EAST-WEST ECONOMIC INTERACTION MUST RECEIVE
CLOSE ATTENTION FROM THOSE CONCERNED WITH WESTERN
SECURITY. IN THIS CONTEXT, TOO, RENEWED WESTERN
ECONOMIC HEALTH AND COOPERATION CAN, IN ADDITION
TO ITS OTHER MANIFEST ADVANTAGES, CONTRIBUTE
SIGNIFICANTLY TO WESTERN SECURITY.

11. SINCE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN SOVIET DETENTE
POLICY IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE WITH THE WEST
AND THE ACQUISITION OF WESTERN CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY,
IT FOLLOWS THAT THE WEST MIGHT INFLUENCE SOVIET POLICY
BY ENCOURAGING SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY RESTRAINT
THROUGH THE EXPANSION OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC
RELATIONS. FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW,
EAST-WEST ECONOMIC COOPERATION IS DESIRABLE FOR MANY
REASONS, BUT THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY
ASPECTS OF DETENTE ARE NOT UNCONNECTED. TO PREVENT
SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE
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ALLIANCE AND TO CAPITALIZE ON THE WEST'S ECONOMIC
ADVANTAGES, IT IS DESIRABLE TO INSTITUTE ANNUAL
HIGH-LEVEL WESTERN CONSULTATIONS ABOUT CURRENT
SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AND ITS
POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST-WEST ECONOMIC
COOPERATION, WITH THE AIM OF CONSIDERATING APPROPRIATE
CRITERIA TO FACILITATE AN EXPANSION OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC
RELATIONS THAT IS VIABLE IN THE LONG TERM AND CAN
CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVED POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS.
IT IS ALSO DESIRABLE FOR THE WESTERN POWERS TO EXCHANGE
VIEWS AND TIMELY INFORMATION ABOUT ECONOMIC TRENDS
IN THE USSR AND EAST EUROPE AND ABOUT EMERGING

PATTERNS IN EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS MAY BE ESPECIALLY DESIRABLE IN LIGHT OF THE POSSIBLE ADVERSE IMPACT OF EASTERN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES ON WESTERN ECONOMIES. STUDY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO A COLLECTIVE APPROACH TO THE EXPANSION OF CREDIT FACILITIES FOR EAST-WEST TRADE IN WAYS THAT WOULD SUPPLEMENT EXISTING INSTITUTIONS AND PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR RESPONSIBLE SOVIET BEHAVIOR ON OTHER ISSUES. REALISTIC COCOM RESTRAINTS ON THE TRANSFER OF MILITARILY RELEVANT TECHNOLOGY CAN CONTINUE TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO WESTERN SECURITY.

D. THE IMPENDING SOVIET SUCCESSION

12. IN THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD, THERE IS BOUND TO BE AT LEAST ONE CHANGE OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU, AND ADDITIONAL TURNOVER AMONG SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP IS HIGHLY LIKELY. DRAMATIC RUPTURES WITH THE PAST ARE IMPROBABLE, BUT THIS PERIOD OF SUCCESSION IS LIKELY TO BE PROLONGED, AND IT IS FRAUGHT WITH CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY. THOUGH THE RISING GENERATION OF POTENTIAL
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LEADERS WILL SHARE A FUNDAMENTAL COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC FEATURES OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND TO THE PARTY'S DOMINANT ROLE, THIS GROUP IS HARDLY HOMOGENEOUS, AND NO ONE CAN SAY WITH CERTAINTY WHAT POLICY LINES WILL EMERGE AS DOMINANT. INDEED, THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE ITSELF IS LIKELY TO EXACERBATE PERSONAL AND FACTIONAL RIVALRIES AND POLICY DIVERGENCIES.

13. THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE SUCCESSION PERIOD WILL PROBABLY BE TO CAUSE CONTROVERSIAL OR POLITICALLY COSTLY DECISIONS TO BE POSTPONED. HOWEVER, AS THE SUCCESSION PROCESS CONTINUES, CONTENDERS MAY OFFER ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING THE MULTIPLE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS FACING THE REGIME. SOME WILL DOUBTLESS PRESS FOR CONSERVATISM AND CONTINUITY, SOME MAY URGE A MORE NATIONALISTIC AND REPRESSIVE ORIENTATION, SOME MAY SUGGEST "LIBERALIZING" REFORMS, ANDSTILL OTHERS MAY OFFER QUITE UNEXPECTED PROPOSALS FOR POLICY INNOVATION. A GENUINE SYSTEMIC CRISIS ACCOMPANYING THE SUCCESSION SEEMS VERY UNLIKELY, BUT DELAY, UNCERTAINTY, AND EVEN CONTRADICTORY INITIATIVES IN BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS WOULD NOT BE UNEXPECTED. ALTHOUGH NEW LEADERS WILL HAVE TO GRAPPLE WITH A NUMBER OF

SERIOUS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, THEY WILL ALSO HAVE

AVAILABLE A GREATER CAPABILITY TO PROJECT SOVIET
POWER GLOBALLY THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS HAVE HAD.

14. THE WEST WILL NEED TO EXERCISE PATIENCE AND
RESTRAINT DURING THE SUCCESSION PERIOD, WHILE
REMAINING SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF
ALLIANCE POLICIES ON THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW
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LEADERSHIP. IT WOULD BE UNWISE AND FUTILE TO
ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THE SUCCESSION
STRUGGLE IN TERMS OF CONTENDING PERSONALITIES OR
GROUPS. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, TO INFLUENCE
THE OUTCOME IN TERMS OF POLICY, BY PRUDENT EFFORTS
TO MAKE SOME ALTERNATIVES SEEM MORE REWARDING THAN
OTHERS. THE PROSPECT OF INCREASING, MUTUALLY
BENEFICIAL EAST-WEST INTERACTION CAN PLAY A ROLE
IN THIS CONNECTION, AS CAN WESTERN STRENGTH AND
RESOLVE IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY. AS WE
APPROACH THIS TRANSITION PERIOD, THE OBJECT SHOULD
BE TO PROVIDE POSITIVE INCENTIVES FOR THE EMERGING
LEADERS. WESTERN POLICIES BEFORE THE TRANSITION
PERIOD, AS WELL AS DURING THE CONSOLIDATION PHASE
OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP, SHOULD BE TAILORED TO ENCOURAGE
SOVIET MODERATION, RESTRAINT, AND COOPERATIVE
BEHAVIOR, AND TO DISCOURAGE SOVIET ADVENTURISM,
MILITARISM, AND EXPANSIONISM.

E. PROSPECTIVE DIFFICULTIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

15. DURING THE PERIOD AHEAD, THE COUNTRIES OF
EASTERN EUROPE WILL BE CHARACTERIZED BY CONSIDERABLE
POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY, MARKEDLY GREATER THAN IN
THE USSR. TO THE LONG-STANDING, UNDERLYING TENSIONS
WILL BE ADDED SEVERAL NEWLY ACCENTUATED FACTORS.
PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN EASTERN EUROPE
ARE IN GENERAL EVEN MORE PROBLEMATIC THAN IN THE
SOVIET UNION, IN PART BECAUSE THE REGION IS VERY
DEPENDENT ON IMPORTS OF ENERGY AND RAW MATERIALS.
RISING CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS AND FALLING GROWTH
RATES WILL CREATE AN ESPECIALLY SHARP DILEMMA
EAST GERMANY, WHERE THE ATTRACTION OF WEST IS
ESPECIALLY GREAT. IN GENERAL, THE NEED AND THE
DESIRE OF THE EAST EUROPE REGIMES FOR ECONOMIC
LINKS WITH THE WEST WILL GROW IN THE YEARS AHEAD,
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THOUGH CONDITIONED BY THE ACCUMULATION OF
AN ALREADY LARGE HARD CURRENCY DEBT.

16. SOME EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES MAY SHOW SOMEWHAT GREATER IDEOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY THAN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, THOUGH WITHIN MODEST LIMITS. NEVERTHELESS, THREE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF UNREST ARE THE POLITICAL DISSIDENTS, CURRENTS OF NATIONALISM (OFTEN HEAVILY TINGED WITH ANTI-SOVIETISM), AND RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT. NONE OF THESE AREAS OF DISSATISFACTION IS BY ITSELF LIKELY TO POSE A SUBSTANTIAL THREAT TO THE REGIMES, BUT IN COMBINATION, ESPECIALLY IF ALSO ACCOMPANIED BY ECONOMIC DISCONTENT, THEY COULD DO SO IN SUCH COUNTRIES AS POLAND AND EAST GERMANY.

17. FOR IDEOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC AND ABOVE ALL, SECURITY REASONS, THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO ASSIGN TOP PRIORITY TO PRESERVING FIRM CONTROL IN EASTERN EUROPE. GIVEN THIS PRIORITY, GIVEN GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY, AND GIVEN THE IMBALANCE IN POWER BETWEEN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE, THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO DOUBT THE SOVIET UNION'S ABILITY TO RETAIN CONTROL, BY MILITARY FORCE, IF NECESSARY. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF MAINTAINING CONTROL, HOWEVER, ARE LIKELY TO GROW DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW AS ARE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND SOME OF THE EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES.

18. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT WILL BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE WEST TO ENCOURAGE IN THE REGIMES OF EASTERN EUROPE TENDENCIES TOWARD AUTONOMY AND INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION. THE AIM OF WESTERN POLICY SHOULD BE, NOT THE SUBVERSION OF THE REGIMES, BUT
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THEIR GRADUAL EVOLUTION IN FAVORABLE DIRECTIONS. THE SCOPE FOR SUCH A POLICY IS GREATEST IN THE ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL AREAS. ONE EFFECTIVE WAY OF IMPLEMENTING THIS POLICY IS THROUGH IMPROVEMENTS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH SELECTED EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY THOSE THAT MANIFEST AUTONOMY OR INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION. GIVEN THE LIMITS OF SOVIET TOLERANCE AND WESTERN POWER, THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS POLICY MUST BE MODESTLY CONCEIVED AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION PRUDENT.

F. SOVIET EXPANSIONISM OUTSIDE EUROPE

19. FOR BOTH GEOPOLITICAL AND DOCTRINAL REASONS, SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY WILL REFLECT A CONTINUING

ATTEMPT TO SHIFT THE GLOBAL CORRELATION OF FORCES IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET UNION. AS IN THE PAST, THIS GOAL IS LIKELY TO BE SOUGHT BY TACTICS OF CAUTIOUS OPPORTUNISM, EXPLOITING OPPORTUNITIES

FOR GAINS WHERE RISKS SEEM MINIMAL. A
CONSTANT THEME WILL BE THE CLAIM FOR FULL
RECOGNITION AS A GLOBAL SUPERPOWER.

20. SOVIET ACTIONS IN PURSUIT OF THESE OBJECTIVES
WILL BE SERVED BY THE USSR'S GROWING MILITARY
CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY ITS INCREASING CAPACITY
FOR POWER PROJECTION. IN THE POST-COLONIAL ERA, THE
SOVIETS' IDEOLOGICAL

WEAPON HAS LOST CREDIBILITY AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY
AND THE ECONOMIC FACTOR WILL CONTINUE TO BE MARGINAL.
IN AN ERA CHARACTERIZED BY THE DIFFUSION OF POWER, THE
GROWING POLITICAL CONFIDENCE AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF
MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES CAN POSE NEW OBSTACLES TO
SOVIET EXPANSION. IN SOVIET DEALINGS WITH THE THIRD
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WORLD, MILITARY AID WILL PLAY A PROMINENT ROLE, POS-
SIBLY ACCOMPANIED INCREASINGLY BY THE USE OF PROXIES,
SUCH AS THE CUBANS. THE OUTLOOK IS THUS FOR COMPETI-
TION AND OCCASIONAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE
WEST IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE.
BECAUSE OF THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE TO BOTH EAST AND
WEST OF ACCESS TO ENERGY SUPPLIES, THE PERSIAN GULF
COULD BECOME A PARTICULARLY CRITICAL AREA.

22. RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
WILL CONTINUE TO BE A PRIME SOURCE OF CONCERN TO THE
SOVIET LEADERSHIP. FOR BOTH GEOPOLITICAL AND IDEO-
LOGICAL REASONS, A SIGNIFICANT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN
THE USSR AND CHINA IS UNLIKELY IN THE PERIOD UNDER
REVIEW, SO THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO BE
PREPARED FOR CONFRONTATION ON THE EASTERN BORDER.
THIS SITUATION UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTES TO THE OVERALL
SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP; IT COULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO
SOVIET INTEREST IN DETENTE WITH THE WEST.

23. EUROPEAN SECURITY WILL BE INTIMATELY AFFECTED BY
THE BALANCE OF POWER IN ALL THESE AREAS OF THE WORLD.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE WEST MUST CONTINUE TO INSIST ON
THE GEOGRAPHIC INDIVISIBILITY OF DETENTE, PARTICULARLY
IN AREAS WHERE ESSENTIAL WESTERN INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED.
IN ORDER TO PROMOTE GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT IN THE THIRD
WORLD AND TO DISCOURAGE THE SOVIETS' TEMPTATION TO
EXPAND THE AREA OF THEIR CONTROL AND IN-
FLUENCE, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE WEST TO MAINTAIN A
CREDIBLE NATO MILITARY DETERRENT, TO PRESERVE POLITICAL
UNITY AND RESOLVE, TO PROMOTE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, AND TO CREATE DISINCENTIVES
TO SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY. THE
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OBJECTIVE, OUTSIDE EUROPE AS WELL AS WITHIN THE THEATER, IS TO LIMIT THE ATTRACTIVENESS TO THE SOVIETS OF MILITARY COMPETITION AND THUS TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF NON-MILITARY COOPERATION.

G. THE LOSS OF SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL MOMENTUM

24. THE SHOPWORN SOVIET IDEOLOGY WILL BE INCREASINGLY IRRELEVANT TO MUCH OF THE SOVIET POPULATION AND TO MANY OF THOSE PEOPLE IN THE OUTSIDE WORLD TO WHOM THE SOVIETS WISH TO APPEAL, ALTHOUGH IDEOLOGY WILL CONTINUE TO INFORM THE SOVIETS' PERSPECTIVE ON THE WORLD. THE REGIME'S IDEOLOGY NO LONGER MEETS SOVIET SOCIETY'S REQUIREMENTS BOTH FOR A CREDIBLE SYSTEM OF VALUES AND FOR A SYSTEM WHICH PROVIDES ANSWERS TO THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES OF THE TIMES. ALTHOUGH DISSIDENCE WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION IS UNLIKELY TO BE A MAJOR SOURCE OF INSTABILITY, THE NATIONAL QUESTION WILL REMAIN A DELICATE ONE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, EXACERBATED BY DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS THAT ARE REDUCING THE NUMERICAL PREDOMINANCE OF THE GREAT RUSSIANS. THE ENERGIZING APPEAL OF ORTHODOX MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY WILL DECLINE, PARTICULARLY IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE IDEOLOGICAL FRAGMENTATION OF THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT WILL CONTINUE AND PERHAPS ACCELERATE.

25. THE GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE HUMANE SOCIETY IN THE USSR AND THE SOVIET BLOC IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST. WESTERN GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD KEEP THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS HIGH ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, IN PARTICULAR CONTINUING TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY. WESTERN POWERS SHOULD RETAIN THE INITIATIVE OVER THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF NON-MATERIAL VALUES, PROVIDING IT IS EXERCISED IN WAYS LIKELY TO PRODUCE THE DESIRED RESULTS AND NOT TO PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR SAVAGE REPRESSION OR TO EN-
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COURAGE HOPELESS REVOLT. THE CSCE EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THE SOVIET THRESHOLD OF TOLERANCE CAN BE RAISED SOMEWHAT, AND THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONTINUE CONSULTATION ON CSCE-RELATED ISSUES, LOOKING TOWARD THE MADRID CONFERENCE IN 1980. THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL MESSAGE IS THAT, BY CONTRAST TO IDEOLOGICAL DECAY IN THE EAST, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL VITALITY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE PERSISTS.

H. CONCLUSION

26. IN RECENT YEARS THE SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE TO WESTERN SECURITY HAS TAKEN ON GLOBAL DIMENSIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, EXPANDING INTERACTION AND COOPERATION

BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ON A WIDE RANGE OF MUTUAL INTERESTS HAS INCREASED THE COMPLEXITY OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE ALLIANCE MUST ADAPT ITS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH BOTH THESE TRENDS OVER THE LONG HAUL, LOOKING BOTH TO A STRONG WESTERN DEFENSE AND DETERRENT POSTURE, AND TO EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL POLICIES. IN THIS RESPECT, THE ALLIES REAFFIRM THEIR DEDICATION TO THE PURSUIT OF BOTH DEFENSE AND DETENTE. IN THE LONG RUN, SECURITY CAN BEST BE FURTHERED BY MEANS WHICH SEEK TO MOVE THE SOVIETS IN A DIRECTION OF MORE RESPONSIBILITY IN FOREIGN POLICY AND TOWARD A LESS AUTHORITARIAN SOCIETY. THE CHALLENGE FOR THE WEST TODAY IS HOW TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FAVORABLE TRENDS IN SOVIET SOCIETY AND ENCOURAGE LONG-TERM EVOLUTION WHICH WILL MAKE THE SOVIETS LESS THREATENING.

27. RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGES AHEAD WILL REQUIRE IMPROVED PROCESSES OF ALLIANCE-WIDE CONSULTATION AND
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INCREASED POLITICAL AND MILITARY COHESION. (THIS STUDY ITSELF CONSTITUTES AN OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE OF ALLIANCE COOPERATION ON ISSUES OF GREAT COMPLEXITY AND IMPORTANCE.) NATO'S FORTITUDE CAN BE STRENGTHENED, TOO, BY INCREASING PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE PURPOSES OF THE ALLIANCE AND BY INVOLVING BROADER SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION IN ALLIANCE AFFAIRS THROUGH A VARIETY OF MEANS, INCLUDING PERHAPS AN ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY, BRINGING TOGETHER LEGISLATORS FROM MEMBER STATES TO DISCUSS ISSUES FACING THE WEST. AWARE OF NEW CHALLENGES AND STRENGTHENED BY RENEWED COMMITMENT, THE ALLIANCE CAN MOVE TOWARD ITS FOURTH DECADE WITH CONFIDENCE.
END TEXT. VANCE

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